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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA JONES,
MELBA JONES, HAROLD JONES, LINDA
JONES and SHIRLEY JONES, minor children
of HAROLD }fiNOR JONES, Deceased,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
and CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendants.

THE ISSUE

I

~''

Though they state the proposition in various ways
and in different places in their Brief (P. 2, 43), Counsel
for Plaintiffs concede that the only question in this
case, as they say "under the rules of law applicable to
the review herein to be had'' is whether the Commission
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding as it did.
What are the rules of law applicable in a review of
decisions of the Industrial Commission by this Court
are not set out when the issue is stated, but appear later
in the Brief under the caption ''Binding Effect Of
Commission's Decision" (P. 29) in quotations from decisions of this Court, and indeed those ''rules'' are so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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well settled as to admit of no dispute. The principal
decisions are reviewed in the case of W oodhur~ ·vs. Industrial Commission et al, 111 U. 393 (181 P. 2nd 209).
The Court ilJ. that case (speaking .through J uetice Wolfe)
said:
''The extent of review by this Court in this type
of case is: Did the Commission act without or in
excess of its powers in :denying compensation to
the plaintifff Section 42-1-78, U.C.A. 1943.
"The test applicable to this type of case to determine whether or not the Commission acted
without or in excess of its powers has been clearly
crystallized by previous opinions and was stated
as follows in Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89
Ut11h 381, 57 P. 2d 724, 725.:
'In the case of denial of compensation, the
record must disclose that there is material,
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it
jl),stify tb~ conclusJop., a~ a ,matter of lawJ
that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily
and capriciously disregarded the evidence or
unreasonably refused to believe sucb evidence.'
''In Lora;nge v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah
261, 153 P. 2nd 272, 273, we quote with approval
from K~va1inakis v. Industrial Com.xnission, 67
Utah 174., 246 P. 698, as follows:
'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the
whole recorD., that the commission clearly aeted
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings
and d-ecision, this court is powerless to il).terfere.
* * * It was not intended, * * * that this Court,

2
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in matters of evidence, should to any extent substitute its judgment for the judgment of the commission.'
''See also Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87
Utah 101, 48 P. 2d 449; Stoddard v. Industrial
Commission, 103 Utah 351, 135 P. 2d 256.
"Upon the whole record, as a matter of law, did
the Commission act arbitrarily or capriciously in
finding that the coronary occlusion or thrombosis which plaintiff suffered was not precipitated
or caused by an accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment 1''
Other cases upon the limitations governing the Court
in such a review as this to the same effect are cited by
Counsel, namely, Robertson vs. Industrial Commission,
109 U. 25, 163 P. 2nd 331, and Ostler v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 428, 36 P. 2nd 95.
Inasmuch as in this case, as in the Woodburn case,
a coronary occlusion is involved, the question in this
case may be stated as it was in that case: JJpon the
whole record, as a matter of law, did the Commission
act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that the coronary occlusion which decedent suffered was not precipitated by an accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment?
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION
As is perhaps to be expected from counsel against
whose client the decision went, counsel for plaintiffs
are extremely critical of the Commission's decision.
They say that it "intermingles findings, arguments,
conclusions and judgment". Whether it is subject to

3
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such or any criticism, and especially whether there is
anything inherent in it which discloses that the Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously can best be determined by an examination of it. Inasmuch as it is not
set out in full in Plaintiffs' Brief, at the outset we set
it out in full herein:
''BEFORE THE· INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
Claim No. 5283
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA
JONES, MELBA JONES, HAROLD
JONES, LINDA JONES, and SHIRLEY
JONES, minor children of Harold Minor
Jones, deceased,
.APPLICANTS,
vs.
CALIFORNIA P ,A.CKING CORPORATION,
DEFENDANT.
DECISION
''The above entitled cause came on regularly for
hearing at Ogden, Utah, December 5, 1950, at
10 :00 o'clock .A.M. in the County Courthouse, before the Industrial Commission of Utah, pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission. .Applicant was present and represented by her attorneys, Clyde C. Patterson and Stuart P. Dobbs;
defendant was represented by J . .A. Howell and
Neil R. Olmstead, attorneys.

''It is not disputed that ~iinor Jones died as a
result of a coronary occlusion. The only issue
to be resolved is the cause of the occlusion. Was
4
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it the result of an accident arising out of or in
the course of employment' We think it was not.
In the determination of that question, the responsibility is upon us to find the ultimate fact.
In Utah Delaware lYiining Co. v. Indemnity Company, 76 U. 187, 289 P. 94, the Utah Supreme
Court said:
'Whether the present disabilities were or
were not attributable to the injuries received
at the time of the accident, constitute the
ultimate fact or question to be determined
by the Commission. They were not bound
to accept a mere opinion of an expect on such
an ultimate question unless such was the
only reasonable conclusion to reach in the
premises.'
''We are not unmindful of, nor do we disregard
the opinion of the physicians as to the autopsy
findings on the physical condition of the body
and the medical theories founded by experts on
the cause of coronary occlusions. We do, however, hold that the Commission and the Commission alone can and must determine the ultimate
issue; namely, was the injury (coronary occlusion) caused by an accident arising out of or in
the course of employment by defendant.
''In other words, assuming that exertion, emotional upset, fatigue, worry, gas may cause a
coronary occlusion alone or in combination, was
there exertion, etc, sufficient to cause the occlusion in this particular individual, not overlooking, of course, the physical and mental makeup of
the deceased' Furthermore, we may or. may not
believe the evidence introduced to prove that the
exertion etc. singly or in combination Were sufficient to charge the employment with liability
for the injury.
5
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''Commissioner Wisley viewed the premises with
the consent of the parties. He does not believe
that movement of the air through the building
was sufficiently obstructed to create an unhealthy
condition in the area where the motors were situated. The motors were not enclosed. Furthermore, although we may assume that a balky
motor gives off some carbon dioxide gas, there
is not evidence to support a finding that the
oxygen content of the air breathed by deceased
had been reduced to such an extent that the oxygen content of the blood was sufficiently reduced
to cause 'sludging' of the blood which in turn
caused the blocking of the coronary artery. In
fact, the gas theory is important only if we accept the "Sludging" theory, which we do not.
''The evidence regarding exertion, fatigue, worry
is very unsatisfactory. In fact, if we believe all
that evidence, we must conclude that deceased
was not subjected to any of these factors in a
degree materially in excess of the exertion, etc.
to which all individuals in every walk of life or
at home are subjected.
''The physicians who testified all stated that they
were not concerned with exertion, gas, or fatigue
except in combination. All of them stated that
all of the circumstances combined might contribute to the occlusion. We do not believe that the
combination of circumstances which applicant attempts to prove constitute an accident and that
the employer should be charged with the results
of a combination of forces operating within and
without the employment over a period of days,
particularly when everybody is almost daily subjected to the same forces in substantially the
same degree.
6
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''There is still much confusion and 'disagreement
among medical men as to the cause of coronary
occlusions. Some hold that exertion may cause
an intimal hemmorhage and thus :result in an
occlusion. In this case the autopsy revealed no
break in the intima and no hemmorhage. A tumor
or blister was discovered at the point of the
occlusion. This was filled with Cholesterol (fatty
molecules) but had not ruptured. It was of long
standing as was the scleroais of the artery in
which the clot was found. The autopsy reveals
none of the findings relied upon by those who
believe in the exertion theory.
''Applicant cited authority in support of the exertion theory, but it should be noted that the experts used the words ''severe exertion''. The
same is true of fatigue. Th-ere 1s no evidence .of
exertion or fatigue.
''No evidence of monoxide gas pol.soning was
found nor any evidence that carbon dioxide was
a factor. In fact, we find no medical authority
to support the gas or "sludging" theory of Dr.
Zeman.
''Emotional upsets, severe, are sometimes named
as a cause of coronary occlusion. We are inclined
to give credence to this view. However, the
evidence in this case does not justify a finding
o.f a severe emotional upset.
"In conclusion, we point to the fact that all the
doctors stated that they attached no significance
to any of the factors such as exertion, gas, fatigue
or nervous strain, standing alone, but they did
say that it was possible that all the surrounding
circumstances over a period of two or three days
might have contributed to the occlusion. This
theory would charge every employer with every
7
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occlusion (and other ailments) occurring on the
premises, during the hours of employment, and
for that matter with occlusion and other ailments
which occur off the premises before or after the
hours of employment if not too remote in point
of time. We cannot subscribe to that theory.
''We find that the coronary occlusion which
caused the death of Minor Jones was not the
result of an accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment, nor was it_contributed
to by any of the conditions or activities of the
deceased in connection with his employment, or
by any combination of them, and if the occlusion
is determined to be an accident, we find that the
employment had nothing to do with the occlusion.
The application is therefore denied.
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application of Flora K. Jones, widow of Harold Minor
Jones, deceased, is denied.
(Signed) Otto A. Wiesley, Chairman
R. H. Dalrymple, Commissioner
H. Fred Egan, Commissioner
(SEAL)
February 16, 1951. ''
We submit that the decision on its face certainly
does not disclose that the Commission acted arbitrarily
or capriciously, on the contrary it discloses that the
Commission carefully considered all of the evidence, and
the claims of the Plaintiffs that they were entitled to
an award, and after such consideration decided against
such an award. To determine, then, the question as to
whether the Commission acted arbitrarily of capriciously the Court must consider the evidence as a whole,
because if there is any evidence to sustain the ultimate

8
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fact found by the Commission, namely that the coronary
occlusion which caused the decedent's death was not
precipitated by an accident arising out of or in the course
of decedent's employment, then the decision of the Commission must stand in accordance with the ''rules apli...
cable" to this review, as above set out. N otwithstanding these "rules", which counsel for plaintiffs concede,
counsel seem to contend that this Court may substitute
its findings for the findings of the Commission, or else
it is impossible to account for their request at the conclusion of their Brief that the Court should not only
reverse the Commission's decision, but itself make an
award to plaintiffs or direct the Commission to make
sueh an a ward.
It would seem that inasmuch as the Court in this
case will have to examine the entire record in order to
determine the issue in this case it is a work of supererogaton for the parties to make a statement of facts,
which necessarily will be at least to some extent partisan.
However, as counsel for plaintiffs have made an elaborate statement of the facts from their point of view, we
deem it proper to make one from ours, and especially
to point out wherein, as we conceive it, the other side
has not correctly stated the facts, or has exaggerated
them, or drawn unwarranted inferences therefrom.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, California Packing Corporation,
operates a plant in Weber County for the processing of
vegetables, including peas. As preliminary to such processing of peas, it is necessary to shell them, and in the
season of 1950, for that purpose, the company maintained
9
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a number of viners in the area, including one at Fielding, Clinton, Syracuse, Huntsville and Hooper (Tr.
173), to which the peas were hauled still in their shells
upon the vines, and there threshed from them the peas
which were then trucked in boxes to the cannery. The
operation of these viners is, of course, a seasonal operation, and because of the perishable character of the
product they must be speedily handled over a brief
period of time. The evidence in this case discloses that
prior to the run of peas, or the starting of the campaign,
as it is called by those concerned with it, a meeting was
held by the plant superintendent with those who had
been selected to act as field men and as foremen at the
various viners. At that meeting, Harold Minor Jones,
who had been selected as foreman of the Hooper Viner,
was present. The duties of Mr. Jones, as such foreman
of the Hooper Viner were of a supervisory character,
hiring his crew and training them to do the work the
way he wanted it done, to see that the viners operated
properly, that the viners were run at the right speed,
and to see that the shelled peas were loaded for transportation to the cannery as quickly as possible (Tr. 176177).
At this meeting he was given authority to organize
a double crew to operate the viner when he deemed it
necessary, and also to employ a relief foreman for himself. This is important because some point is made in
the Brief of Plaintiffs that subsequent to Decedent's
death there were two foremen. The operation was just
getting started and had not reached it peak on July
3rd when Jones died, and moreover the fact that he
had not employed a relief foreman as he had a perfect

10
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right to do, is the best evidence that he did not consider
himself so fatigued or tired as to need one and that in
fact he was not (Tr. P. 177).
Jones was an experienced foreman; he had worked
for the Company since several years before 1938 (Tr.
173), and he had been foreman of the Clinton, Syracuse,
and Huntsville viners; the Syracuse and Huntsville
Viners 'had the same number ( 4) of viners as the Hooper
Viner (Tr. 173), and his duties at the Hooper Viner
were substantially the same as at the other Viners, of
which be had been foreman (Tr. 177).
Counsel for Plaintiffs in their Brief assume that
the crew which Jones selecled was composed of inexperienced men because only one of them testified he had
worked at the Hooper viner before. The reason that
the one witness so testified was that he was asked a
question which demanded such an answer. (Tr. 75) He
also said that one other of the crew had worked at the
viner (Tr. 75). The others were not asked, nor was the
witness as to whether they or the others had worked at
other viners. Ergo, say counsel, they were inexperienced which is as unwarranted an inference as many of
the others made by counsel. Moreover, there is .absolutely nothing to show that the crew was not performing its duties to the satisfaction of the foreman, or that
the manner in which it performed its work had any
emotional or other effect on Jones.
The viner shed at Hooper, as is the case with the
other sheds operated by the defendant Company, was
a structure consisting of a galvanized iron roof with
the necessary supports for it, covered at the north and
11
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south ends, which were thirty-six feet in width, with
the same material, but substantially open on the east
and west sides, such sides being ninety feet long. It's
character is best shown by the floor plan and photographs introduced in evidence by plaintiffs (Exhibits
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). Exhibit 3 shows the floor plan
with the dimensions and location of the machinery, the
four viners, the motors, one being a large engine, and
the other being a small engine, spoken of as the ''booster
motor''. The large motor by means of a belt operated
the shaft, which in turn by means of belts operated the
viners, and the booster motor, as its name implies, was
used in connection with the large motor to increase the
power to speed up the viners when there was a full load
(P. 51), and that period had not as yet been reached
in the run.
Counsel draw the inference because Jones was engaged in the morning of July 3rd attempting to have
it in operation, that the large motor could not operate
the viners, but the best proof that such was not the
case is that the viners were being operated, and Jones
himself during the morning was helping to load the
peas that had been threshed by such operation.
The greater part of the testimony introduced by
plaintiffs was devoted to an attempt to show that notwithstanding the open character of the shed, as shown
by the photographs, it was on July 3rd so obstructed
that the air in the vicinity of the little motor could not
circulate and created an unhealthy condition, presumably
because of the claim that there was an excessive amount
of carbon dioxide in the air (P. 20, 21). So counsel
claim that the finding of the Commission that no such
condition existed is against the uncontradicted evidence.
12
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The only reason counsel say that the circulation of
air was so ob8tructed is their claim that the stacked
boxes of peas on the west side of the shed shut off the
circulation of air from the west, and the trucks loaded
with pea vines on the east. The evidence shows that
both were changing situations, both with respect to the
loaded pea boxes which were regularly being removed,
so that at least at times there would be open spaces
along the west side ( Tr. 65, 73), and the same was true
as to the trucks.
However this may he, the testimony of plaintiffs.'
witnesses as well as defendants, shows that there wa.s a
loading platform on the west of the viner approximately
opposite the little motor, which was kept clear of boxes
in order to enable loading operations to be carried on
(see Exhibit 3), the only difference being as to its width,
the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses giving the width
of two and one-half feet in width (Tr. 58), and the testimony of defendants' witnesses six feet in width (Tr.
193.). ~forever, Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8, show an open
space above the conveyors, beyond which the boxes of
peas were not piled, several feet in width and e~tend..,
ing along the west side from the south side to a point
north of where the small motor was located. No testimony contradicts the existence of this open space. Counsel make a great deal of the fact that su,hsequent to
Jones death some of the galvanized sheeting were removed from the west side, but whether by the Company,
or by whom, or the extent or purpose thereof, is not
shown, although counsel draws the unwarranted inference that such removal was an admission on the part
of the Company that the circulation of air in the shed
was impeded beyond what it should have been.

13
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Counsel also assume that in order for there to be
proper air conditions in the shed, and at the place where
Jones was working on July 3rd, both sides of the shed
would have to be completely open, which is an unwarranted assumption.
So far as the east side is concerned, the trucks and
wagons of the growers which were hauling the pea vines
to the viner, were as they came in lined up on the east
side parallel to it. Each truck was approximately
twenty feet in Jength and four were so placed at a time,
so that there were open spaces between them, aggregating the difference between the ninety feet length of the
platform and the eighty feet of trucks, or approximately
eight to ten feet, or at least two feet between, even according to Plaintiffs' witnesses (Tr. 85). Moreover,
while at least one witness for plaintiffs testified that
some of the larger loads on the trucks as they came in
were higher than the top of the opening, so that the
hauler had to arrange his load so as to come under the
open space, he likewise testified, as was bound to be
the case, that as they were unloaded the space between
the top of the opening became greater and greater until
the bodies of the trucks were reached ( Tr. 59). At all
times and for the full length of the shed on the east side
there would, of course, be additional open spaces above
the hoods of the trucks and under their bodies. It is therefore impossible to conceive that the circulation of air was
impeded to such an extent as to bring about an '' unhealthy condition" at the place or places where Jones
worked on July 3rd, the date of his death, nor do such
condition in any way justify the statement of counsel
that such places were ''hemmed in''. Certainly they do

14
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not warrant the claim that the finding of the Commission
was against the uncontradicted eYidence, especially in
light of the fact that the Commission who heard the
case, in addition to hearing all the evidence, went out
and viewed the viner at the time of the hearing, which
was December 5, 1950.
Counsel for their Brief are extremely critical of
the Commissioner who conducted the hearing with respect to this matter. They say ''We submit that the
Commissioner may well be charged with lack of that
constructive imagination requisite to visualize, on a
winter's day, with the machinery removed, the enclosing
sides altered, and no obstructions about the place, just
what the conditions were like the preceding July 3rd. ''
(P. 21) There is nothing to show, however, that in making the finding that there was not sufficient showing
of a lack of circulation of air of a character which would
in anywise contribute to the coronary occlusion suffered by decedent, the Commissioner who heard the
evidence failed to consider his view in the light of such
evidence, which is all that is required of the trier of the
facts. The trier of the facts is not required to substitute, imagination "constructive", or otherwise, as a
substitute for proof. The gravamen of the complaint
of counsel for Plaintiffs against the Commission in
this, as in other instances, to which we shall have occasion later to say, is that in making its findings of fact
it failed to exercise some sort of imagination, as a substitute for proof.
Finally, in this connection, we deem it proper to
invite the Court's attention, and as bearing upon the
question as to the "unhealthy condition" of the air in
15
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the vicinity of the small motor, the testimony of Dr.
Zeman, the medical witness, upon whom Counsel for
Plaintiffs most rely, because he elminated the condition of the air as a cause of the coronary occlusion, (Tr.
122, 134, 144) which Jones suffered. The result of the
doctor's statement is that he would concur in the Commission's finding as to the condition of the air in the
shed where Jones was working.
The run or campaign for peas at the Hooper viner
commenced on June 28, and on that day it was operated
for eight hours, from eight thirty until four thirty, and
Jones worked those eight hours on that day, according
to his time card. The method of keeping the time of the
foreman at the viners was for them, including Jones, to
keep their own time by punching their own time cards.
The Hooper viner was not operated on June 29, but
Jones punched his time card for eight hours on that day.
What work he did on that day is not disclosed by the evidence. The viner was operated on June 30 from six
thirty is the morning to six in the afternoon, or 11%
hours, and Jones punched his card for that number of
hours. On July 1 the viner was operated from five
thirty to six forty five, or thirteen and a quarter hours,
and Jones punched his card for that number of hours.
On July 2 the viner was operated from two forty five
a. m. to five p. m. or 14 hours and fifteen minutes, but
Jones punched his card for 15 and one-half hours, or
until 6:15p.m. The evidence shows that he was at the
viner after it had ceased to operate, but what work, if
any, he did during that hour and fifteen minutes is not
disclosed by the evidence. On July 3rd, the day of Jones
death, the operation was commenced at 2:00 a. m. and
16
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he punched his card as commencing his work at that
hour and his card was punched as ending his work at
10 a.m., or a period of eight hours.
Counsel for Plaintiffs in their Brief assume that
he worked longer than shown by his own record. Counsel on cross-examination asked these questions of the
1Ir. Wethers, Plant Superintendent, who had testified
as to these time cards :

'' Q. There may be more time than shows on these
cards!
A. If he don't punch the card.

Q. If he put in more hours, it would not show?
A. No, but I have not had that occasion to happen yet." (Tr. 178).
Certainly it did not happen in Jones' case, at least
so far as July 3rd is concerned, because his card was
punched as showing he completed his ·work at 10 a. ni.
(Tr. 176). and he left the viner for his home sometime
between nine o'clock that morning and ten o'clock, which
would be somewhat less than eight hours. The net result is that after having worked for at tnost fifteen and
one-half hours, and perhaps not more than fourteen and
one quarter hours, he was not required to be at work
until two o'clock the following morning, or a period of at
least seven hours and more for eating, rest or sleep, or
whatever else he chose to do. How he spent the hours
between is not disclosed by the evidence, except that in
the evening he milked his cows (Tr. 115).
His wife testified that her husband came home about
seven thirty; that they had supper, but that he did not
go to bed until about eleven o'clock, although he had laid
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down in front of the door in the living room prior to
that time, and he did not get up until about ten or fifteen minutes to two in the morning (Tr. 33), when he
dressed and left for work (Tr. 33). She said that he kept
turning and tossing in his sleep. Asked what caused him
to have difficulty in sleeping she answered it was solely
the heat which affected her the same as him ( Tr. 41).
He came back at 6 :30 in the morning for breakfast,
and then went back to work, and at that time the evidence does not disclose that she observed anything whatsoever wrong with him.
There is considerable testimony as to the heat that
morning, and particularly in the vicinity of the small
motor at the viner, the testimony being that the thermometer in the large motor showed two hundred degrees.
Whether it is sought to be implied that the temperature
was the same as that in the interior of the motor is not
clear, but, of course, that would not be true any more
than the fact that the temperature of the water in the
motor of an automobile would cause the temperature
to be the same in the automobile, and just how hot it
was at the home ·or. in the shed where the small motor
was located is not shown with any exactness. There is
the testimony of the wife already referred to that it was
very hot in the house, and there is testimony that it was
very hot in the shed in the vicinity of the motor. How
hot no one could say with any exactness. However, the
official temperature~ at the Municipal Airport were
introduced in evidence. They show that the maximum
temperature on July 1 was 98 degrees, which maximum
may be higher than the hourly readings, on July 2, 92
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degrees, and on July 3, 93 degrees. What is more pertinent is that at 12:30 a.m., July 3rd, it was 69.3 degrees;
it gradually went down until at 6 :30 it was. 65 degrees,
then started to raise until at 8 :30 it was 71.1; at 8 :30,
75.2 and at 9:30, 78.8 (See sheet of Tr. 26). The exact
distance of the airport to the viner was not shown, because the Commissioner did not deem that important
(Tr. 186), and we make no claim that the temperatures
would be exactly the same everywhere in the area, but
at least it is the best evidence that could be had.
In the light of these facts, as to the actual hours of
labor and the prevailing heat, we now must consider
the evidence as to just what was the character of the
work Jones was doing, and the circumstances thereof
during the afternoon of the 2nd and the morning of
July 3rd. It appears that about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 2nd, after the run, Mr. Porter, who is the
auto mechanic boss of the Company, and Mr. Geiger
visited the viner and talked to Jones, who said he was
having trouble with the small motor, and they cleaned
the spark plugs and checked it. There is no evidence
that they changed the rings, as claimed by counsel for
the plaintiffs in their Brief. It then seemed to run all
right (Tr. 180). Neither Porter or Geirger saw him any
more, but Porter talked to him over the telephone about
seven o'clock on the morning of the third, when Jones
told him that he had had a lot of trouble with the motor.
Porter asked him what it was, and Jones said it ran
about forty-five minutes that morning and that after
that he had had trouble with it. So Porter told him he
was pretty sure what the trouble was, and that if he
(Jones) would make the measurements so a flexible line
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could be procured to hook on an auxiliary, he (Porter)
would send it down (Tr. 182). However, this change
could not be and was not made until after Jones' death
(Tr. 182). This is important, as we consider, because
some of the witness for Plaintiffs testified that the large
motor would not run the viners properly without the
small booster motor even when, as was the case, the peak
load had not been reached. This was contradicted, as we
shall later point out, by the fact that it actually did.
But certainly Jones did not consider that there was any
emergency which required. immediate action else he
would have so informed Porter. Moreover, this incident demonstrates that Jones was not emotionally upset
because the booster motor was not running properly,
else he would have so indicated to Porter. It is to be
borne in mind also that this incident occurred a short
time prior to Jones becoming sick.
There is considerable conflict in the testimony as
to the extent to which Jones was "tinkering" _with the
small motor during the period, and the consequences
flowing therefrom, except there seems to be no dispute
that the character of work he was doing in that regard
was substantially the same on both the 2nd and the 3rd
(Tr. 86).
One witness for Plaintiffs, Othello Munn, one of
Jones' crew, testified he was "tinkering" with the small
motor, either attempting to adjust the carburetor or
attempting to crank it continuously between two o'clock
on the third and the time he became sick ( Tr. 49), and
counsel made the same assumption in putting their hypothetical question to the doctors they called as witnesses,
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and in their Brief. But, of course, that cannot be so,
because Jones himself told Porter on the telephone it
ran all right for forty -five minutes, as above shown, he
spent considerable time in helping to load peas, as above
shown, and he went home to breakfast during that period. ~IoreYer, on cross examination the witness admitted he only observed Jones cranking the little motor two
or three times. (Tr. 62). There is likewise a diversity
in the testimony as to the results of the difficulty Jones
was having with the small motor. Some witnesses
say that while Jones was working on the motor, it was
still connected with the belt, while at least one witness
for plaintiffs says it was disconnected for a period of
four hours prior to Jones' sickness and this is contradicted by other witnesses. (Tr. 81). Some witnesses
say that from the gasoline fed into it, there was gas coming from the motor even when it could not be started,
which is, of course, impossible, and others when it went
a little there was· gas coming from both the gasoline and
the oil. What the gas was, whether carbon dioxide or
carbon monoxide is not disclosed, or the quantity of it.
Considerable stress is laid upon the fact that there
were breaks at the joints of the stove pipe connected
with the exhaust from the motor. This pipe went up
through the roof (Tr. 89). One witness on direct examination said that smoke came out at the first joint,
which was about the height of a man's face (Tr. 97),
and another witness on cross examination said he observed no smoke coming out, but saw it going up the pipe
(Tr. 99). It should be noted also that Frazier, the viner
superviser, when he came to the viner in that capacity
on July 3rd about 6:30 in the morning said on cross
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examination by Plaintiffs' counsel that he did not notice
any fumes, either gasoline or oil fumes (Tr. 190). In
any event, no traces of gas were found in the lungs or
in the blood, and as indicated, Dr. Zeman eliminated had
air as a cause of the coronary occlusion suffered by the
decedent and also carbon monoxide.
Absolutely no evidence was offered as to the amount
of effort required to crank the small motor or indeed
as to how it was cranked, except that to do so Jones had
to bend over it.
Yet, this testimony is claimed by counsel to show
such unusual effort, or strain, such extreme fatigue and
emotional upset without contradiction so that a finding by the Commission to the contrary is arbitrary and
capricious, and as we view it, such a claim is wholly unwarranted.
There is no dispute that the cause of Jones' death
was a coronary occlusion, but when or where he suffered the attack is not shown. He was apparently all
right at six-thirty in the morning when he went to breakfast and at seven o'clock when he talked to Porter over
the telephone, but from that time until he went outside
and laid down no witness who testified saw him, and
therefore no one can say when or where he was when he
suffered the attack. The only evidence is that he was
observed outside the shed lying down (Tr. 63). When
he was observed lying outside several witnesses went to
him and talked to him, and he said he had a headache,
that he had a pain in the stomach and in the chest (Tr.
64). No one testified that he was sweating at that time,
nor did he complain of sweating. The best estimate of
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the time is that it was about eight-thirty when he went
out, and he laid there about an hour. Then he said he
thought he would be better and came back into the shed,
but did no work at that time, and about nine-thirty
started for home (Tr. 63, 79, 91). His home was about
a city block from the Yiner, about 660 feet (Tr. 32).
At about nine-thirty his wife saw him coming, he was
staggering and when he reached home he said he was
terribly sick at his stomach and he had a pain in the
mid portion of his chest, and in his back (Tr. 37). He
was sweating profusely (Tr. 37). He laid down on
the bed, and within a few minutes he was dead (Tr. 12).
We have now summarized the evidence of all the
witnesses other than that of the doctors, as fairly and
impartially as we can, and there remains only to consider the evidence given by the doctors.
As appears from the evidence of the doctors in this
case, as well as the quotations from medical authorities cited by them, medical opinion is divided as to
whether fatigue, emotion, strain or other conditions
may cause a coronary occlusion. One school of medical
opinion is that there is no relationship whatsoever
between the character of the fatigue, emotion, strain
or other conditions. The leader of this school is Dr.
Masters, whose opinions are quoted in the testimony
of Dr. Zeman. It is conceded that he has conducted more
experiments, and made a greater investigation of the
subject that any one else. As a result of these exten~
sive experiments and investigation, he found that the
incidence of coronary occlusion relative to any stated
activity in the course of twenty four hours approximates the percentage of the day that is devoted to that
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specific activity; ir.. other words, that as many coronary
occlusions occur during the proportion of hours of
the day of twenty four hours that are spent in rest
or sleep as during the proportion of hours spent
at work (Tr. 113). Another school frankly states that
it is impossible to say whether or not coronary occlusion is due to any of such conditions, that the most
that can be said is that it is possible there may be. This
was the testimony of Dr. Zeman, as a witness for the
plaintiffs in the Woodburn case, supra, but this Court
held in that case that such testimony would not justify
it in setting aside a denial of the award in that case. This
is the opinion to which Dr. Peterson, who testified for
the defendants adheres. Now, some two and one half
years later, again testifying for the claimants, Dr. Zeman testified that there could be a relationship of at
least fatigue, strain or emotional upset, d~ending
upon the degree thereof, so be says that, assuming the
facts stated in a hypothetical question by plaintiffs'
counsel, discarding however, the facts so stated with
respect to bad air and carbon monoxide, and basing
his opinion on the assumed facts as to fatigue, strain
and emotional upset, there was such connection in this
case.
The facts assumed in the hypothetical question
were that
"Jones was a man about thirty nine years of
age and apparently in good health prior to the
time of this fatal attack and bad worked approximately sixteen or seventeen hours on the 2nd day
of July after a night in which be bad little sleep,
only a few hours, and went to work on July-be came home July 2nd and went to bed about
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ten-forty-five, for perhaps an hour, tried to sleep
in the doorway on the floor, in the doorway in
front of the house, it being hot. Finally he went
to bed, and again, at twenty minutes to two he
went to work about fiye minutes later. During
the previous day he had had a good deal of trouble
with an engine, a gasoline motor, a portion of
the machinery operating the viner in which he
worked, and shortly thereafter he arrived at
the plant, on Monday, the 3rd, and devoted his
time very largely, practically all of his time, to
working upon the gasoline motor; that the motor
was located in a space perhaps six by eight or
ten feet wide, illustrated by some photographs
which ·we have here. And particularly directing your attention to the exhibits which have
been placed in evidence, Numbers 4 and 1, and
also directing your attention to the plat which
shows substantially the location of the structure, but does not show the presence of the shed
which you see in the photographs, which shed
was between the motors and the front of the
growers' unloading area at the building. You
also see upon the plat the location of the motors,
but from the photograph you can see the position of the shed. From this small motor, a pipe,
an exhaust pipe led to the top of the building,
and it had cracks in it a short distance above the
motor. The motor would run for awhile and then
begin to backfire, on one cylinder and another,
and sometimes it would quit. It was connected
by a system of belts, to a larger motor, and also
that motor was running this motor, and although
it would quit operating of its own accord, but
would nevertheless continue to turn over and
cause the gasoline to be injected into this· pipe.
That the big motor temperature was over two
hundred degrees at times. In the rear of the
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building on the opposite side of these motors the
sheds were filling with boxes at times full of peas,
as the work was done. That when the boxes
were in place there was substantially no air admission in that area on that side opposite the shed,
except a narrow opening about two and a half
feet wide near the motors. That in doing the
work they frequently had occasion to crank the
motor after the belt was disconnected, and his
work was done there squatting or bending over,
largely engaged in trying to correct the carburetor. That while so engaged, approximately at
nine o'clock, eight-thirty to nine, some six and
a half or seven hours after he came to work, he
became ill and complained of stomach trouble
and violent headache and pain in the chest. He
layed down for approximately an hour, and then
proceeded to his home a short distance away. On
entering the home -- before going into that, the
day itself was a warm day and the building in
which he worked, as you observe from Exhibit
6, was the type called a galvanized iron roof and
sides, and the space in which he worked was
quite confined.
''When he entered the yard he was seen to
stagger and he walked into the house and said
something to his wife to the effect that he was
ill and proceeded into the bedroom where he was
found shortly after that on the bed, his face was
white and profuse sweating. The paleness of the
face had been observed while he was at the viner
before that. Very shortly after that his face
took on a darker tings. He apparently was
unable to recognize his wife, and he died within
a relatively short time after entering the house.''
(Tr. 116, 117, 118).

,,.
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This question upon objection of counsel for defendant was modified by adding the following:
'• Q. I will ask you, Doctor, to assume he
was tinkering around the motor, at times working on the carburetor, and at times cranking the
motor, the crank being in the lower part of the
motor and the carburetor on its side ; that a part
of the time he "Tas tinkering around otherwise
and cranking and working with the carburetor.
We have not the exact number of times he had
cranked the motor during the period immediately
prior to the time he became ill, except he was
doing these things. With that additional statement with respect to it.
"Q. The area in whi-ch he worked was not
enclosed in the sense it was sealed in, but it was
obstructed by the viner machines and by the
motors ~hemselves, and by the boxes and by the
conveyor belt, but the building was quite open
but with very little air space from the outside.
The space was not entirely closed but the flow
of air was obstructed in the manner I have detailed. With that further explanation I will ask
you if you see a causal connection between the
factors I have mentioned and the man's death~"
(Tr. 121, Tr. 122).
It is obvious, that the Doctor did not confine himself too strictly to the facts, as stated in the question,
because in his explanation of his answer he assumed
that Jones was under an emotional strain which caused
an inability to perform his work. He said also ''whether
he did more work than ordinarily that would certainly
be a factor" (Tr. 123). He also said that any one of
the single factors stated in the question would not be
sufficient; it would have to be a combination of them
(Tr. 123).
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Dr. Zeman, as shown by the evidence, is a pathologist, not actually engaged in practice, and it was he
who performed the autopsy on the body of the decendent.
It appears from his report upon the autopsy and his
testimony that the cause of death was "the recent complete occlusion and thrombosis of the descending branch
of the left coronary superimposed upon old atheromatous plaques, which he explained to be a thickening
of the wall, which is due to the deposition of a fattylike substance known as cholesterol, and results in a
narrowing of the coroary artery. Except that this
condition was old, the doctor could not say exactly
when it might have occurred. It could have existed from
birth (Tr. 123-125). This condition is not discoverable
by any physical examination prior to death (Tr. 197),
and although it is inferable that decedent was in the
hospital at least once at some time, it does not appear
it was in connection with this condition (Tr. 42). However, it is important because with that condition existing
an acute attack might occur at any time, at any place
and under any conditions.
As already stated, Dr. Zeman stated that the effect
of fatigue, strain or emotional upset depended upon
the degree of any of such factors (Tr. 131, 136), and of
course, the Commission, as ti·iers of the facts, had to
find the degree, and having found, as we submit it had
a right to do in the light of the evidence, that none of
these factors existing in that degree assumed in the
hypothetical question, and the doctor's explanations
of his answer, then it was entirely justified for that
reason alone in rejecting his conclusion.

J~
~J

·28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There is another reason why the Commission was
justified in rejecting his conclusion. Most medical
men, who say that there may be a causal connection
between fatigue, effort or emotion-if severe-do not
attempt to explain the connection. Dr. Zeman, however, attempts to do so by a theory that such factors
might cause a sludging of the blood. Inasmuch as this
theory was flatly rejected by Dr. Peterson in his testimony, the Commission had a right to reject it.
Dr. Olsen, the other doctor who testified for plaintiffs, was asked substantially the same hypothetical
question, with this amendment:
'' Q. If you will assume the facts as they were
presented at that time, with the amendments as
they have been made, and supposing one additional feature; that this man was working in an
area relatively confined, at least partially filled
with smoke or exhaust at times, have you an opinion -- add one additional factor to that; that
during the latter part of his employment and
before he became ill he showed outward manifestations or symptoms; that he was from time
to time engaged in cranking this motor, do you
have any opinion whether or not these facts have
any relation to the cause of death~" (Tr. 158).
It was pointed out, upon the objection by Defendants' counsel, that there was no evidence as to the extent
of the fumes. Notwithstanding the Commissioner concurred, he permitted the amendment (Tr. 158). To the
question was also an addition which stressed the extent
to which "the air was shut off" (Tr. 161), and notwithstanding the Commissioner thereupon said ''I am not
sold on the air being shut off,'' he permitted the question. (Tr. 160).
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The Doctor's answer was ''It is my opinion that
the facts as they existed, on those facts, there was causal connection between those facts and the occurance of
the coronary occlusion.''
His testimony, then, differs from Dr. Zeman's in
that he took into consideration all the factors stated in
arriving at his conclusion and did not eliminate any of
them as did Dr. Zeman. He did say, however, that the
effect of any of the factors depended on the extent, or
degree thereof (Tr. 164-166), and did not refuse to
swallow any of them, as did Dr. Zeman.
As he did not discriminate among them, the result
is that his opinion ·is to be disregarded if the Commission was justified in finding that any of them did not
exist to t:he extent or degree that they could be considered to be contributing factors.
Inasmuch as the Commission had to find the facts,
not merely, assume them, so we may, as we said concerning Dr. Zeman's testimony, inasmuch as it found
that such factors did not exist to the extent or degree
that there could he any causal connection between them,
and the coronary occlusion, the Commission had the undoubted right to reject his conclusion. The only other
witness who te3tified was Dr. Peterson, a witness called
for the defendant.. It seems to us that couns.el for plaintiffs in their brief are· unfair to Doctor Peterson, because
therein they claim that he agreed with the other two doctors, but such js not the case, because he frankly stated
that in his opinion it was impossible to say whether or
not there was any causal connection between the factors
assumed and coronary occlusion, and fairly considered,
that is the· extent of his testimony.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE: BY THE
CO~IMISSION.

Counsel for Plaintiffs in Point 1 of their Brief
state what they assume to be the proposition to the contrary, thus:
''That the Findings of Fact do not find support
in the evidence taken by the Commission.''
Under Point 2 they say
''That the facts in evidence do not support the
Commission's conclusions that Jones' employment had nothing to do with the occlusion."
Under Point 3 they say
''That the Commission erred in its conclusion
that Jones' death was not the result of an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. ''
In Point 4
"That the Commission erred in its conclusion
that Jones' death was not contributed to by any
of the conditions or activities of the deceased in
connection with his employment, or by any combination of them.

•

and in Point 5
''That the Commission abused its discretion in
entering its decision denying an award to the
plaintiffs, and that its decision and order were
against law, and that in reaching such decision,
the said Commission did not .regularly pursue
its authority.''
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and under our Point 1, we ask that what we have to say
be considered an answer to all these five Points in the
Brief of Counsel for Plaintiffs, which substantially state
the contrary of the same proposition as stated by us,
namely, there is evidence in the record to support the
Findings of Fact made by the Commission.
First of all, it is not clear to us, by their statements
under these Points as to exactly what they claim, whether
they claim that the Court will review the facts for the
purpose of determining whether the Court would have
found the facts as did the Commission, or whether it
will confine itself to a determination as to whether
there was any evidence to sustain them, because if
there is such evidence, then it cannot be said that the
Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that
it did not regularly pp.rsue its authority. It is not a
question as to whether the Commission ''erred'', or
abused its discretion, for under the law, as fixed by
this C~urt, and as set out heretofore herein and even
in Counsel's Brief, the limitations on the Court's revie.w of the Industrial Commission are defintely fixed
by the Legislature and as crystallized by the decisions
of this Court, and are, as above stated.
As we havfl already pointed out, to determine the
question as to whether the Commission acted arbitrarily
or capriciously, it will be necessary for the Court to
examine the Record. Counsel for Plaintiffs in thei\
Brief have stated what they consider the evidence shows,
as we have done herein, but after all the Court must
examine it and determine the matter itself. For the
reason that we have already stated, the evidence as
we consider it to have been, to specifically now state why
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we consider that the Commission did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously would be mere reiteration. However,
we do submit that, as we view it, the Court in this particular case does not need to restrict its review, because
even if the Court should determine the facts de novo, it
would find them precisely as the Commission did.
It is conceded that if there is any connection at all

between effort, or strain, fatigue, or any other conditions and a subsequent coronary occlusion, it depends
upon the extent or degree thereof. Counsel cite a number of Utah cases. All of these deal with the subject
of effort, or strain, and all of them say that in order
for there to be any connection between effort or strain
it must be of a degree other than that which is required
in the ordinary course of the work in which the employee . is engaged. Some of the cases speak of that
effort or strain as "over exertion", as "severe", as
"unusual", "too great for the man to undertake the
work", etc., and all connoting that it must be of a
character which is out of the ordinary.
The difficulty of counsel for the Plaintiffs is, then,
that there is a lack of evidence as to the degree of the
effort or strain which they claim.
It consists wholly of the effort or strain in cranking
the small motor. There is dispute as to the length of
time in which decedent was engaged in trying to start
the small motor, but in any event, prior to his heart
attack he had ceased to attempt to start it. What is
more important is that there is no evidence whatsoever
as to the amount of energy required to start or crank
the motor, and it is a mere matter of speculation as to
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what effort or strain was required. In those cases, in
which this Court has held that the effort or strain
sufficed, the proof was clear as to the degree so as to
bring the case within the requirements fixed by the
Court. Counsel for Plaintiffs apparently are aware
of this lack of proof because in their Brief they seek to
have this Court take judicial notice of the fact that cranking a motor, whatever its size, is "strenuous exercise",
(P. 24), and compare this motor to an old model T.
Ford. The difficulty of making up for a deficiency of
evidence by ''judicial notice'', or common knowledge·,
is that such knowledge is that motors are of various
size and condition, from the smallest to the largest,
and of all varieties and vintages, and the amount of
energy required is in relation to such size and condition
and there is no evidence of the effort or strain, or
exercise required of any individual to start this particular motor, not even any evidence as to whether it
was larger or smaller than an old Model T. Ford, or of
what variety or age. In the performance of his duties
the decedent was used to starting this motor, so not only
is there no evidence of the energy of any individual
to start it, but no evidence of the energy required of
decedent. In the absence of such evidence, the Commission could not find that there was effort or strain
of the character required by the decisions of this Court,
and if it had so found, its finding could not have been
sustained.
None of the cases specifically deal with the other
factors which Counsel claim contributed in combination
with the strain of starting the motor to cause the
coronary occlusion which Jones suffered. None of the
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Utah cases specifically deal with fatigue, emotional
upset or any other condition other than effort or strain,
but we assume that the same rule would apply to such
factors, namely, that they would have to be of the same
extent or degree as in the case of effort or strain.
It is claimed that decedent was fatigued at the time,
but there is absolutely no evidence that he was or the
extent thereof. The record can be scanned from one
end to the other and no evidence can be found that he
was, and even if he were there is no evidence that the
employer could be charged with responsibility for it.
It is true he worked long hours on the 2nd, but so far
as the employer is concerned, he had at least seven hours
between the completion of that work and when he commenced work again-how he spent or used those hours
was a matter of his own choosing, not his employer, nor
is the employer responsible for his manner of using or
spending it and he had not yet worked eight hours after·
that interval, indeed much less up to the time he quit
doing any actual work.
Counsel in their Brief raise the query as to whether
or not this Court will take judicial notice of the Federal
wage and hour law ( Tr. 23). There need be no question
about it, if it is pertinent, but when it does it will likewise take judicial notice of the exceptons therein in the
case of seasonal work such as this as to an eight hour
day being a normal day's work. Irrespective of this,
there is not shown by the evidence any degree of
fatigue on the part of Jones, or indeed any fatigue,
and if the Commission had so found it would have been
in the teeth of the evidence.
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The only other factor which Plaintiffs can rely
upon as }laving, in combination with others, contributed
to the coronary occlusion Jones suffered is "emotional
upset", but here again there is no evidence whatsoever
that he was emotionally upset, on the contrary it is not
shown that he was even when he became sick.
About all that counsel can claim is that, according
to their notions, he should have been. "What they claim
should have upset him was that he should have become
exasperated because he could not start the small motor,
as counsel conceive they would have been. They concede that "some of the members of the Court may not
have experienced the emotion which arose in the human
breast when the Model T quit, backfired, etc.'' so they
proceed to tell the court how they felt presumably as a
result of their experience. But this recollection on their
part cannot be a substitute for evidence which does not
exist. On the contrary, as late as seven o'clock, just
after he had been to breakfast, when there is no indication that he was upset, he had his conversation with
the employee of the company who had charge of motors
and whom Jones told of his trouble with the small motor
and Porter told him he thought he knew what the.
trouble was, to make the necessary measurements so
that the trouble could be eliminated. There is no evidence that Jones made these measurements or reported
them to Porter. It is to be borne in mind that Jones as
foreman was charged with the responsibility of keeping '
the viner in operation so as to take care of the peas as ·~
they came into it, he was not himself required to make ~
any repairs to the motors. There were other employees 1
who were charged with that responsibility. So when he j
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reported the difficulty and the employee whose responsibility it was to take care of the matter, Jones' re-:sponsibility ended. T·wo conclusions irresistably result
from this, first that at least so far as Jones was concerned,-and that is the important thing-he considered
that the operation of the viner was not interfered with
by the fact that the small motor would not run. In
other words, that the large motor would carry the load.
And, secondly, that he was not worried, or disturbed, or
emotionally upset because it would take some time to
make repairs so the small motor would run, else he
would haYe made the making of the repairs an emergency
matter.
The other claims of Counsel for the Plaintiffs, as
to the air being hemmed in and the gas, of whatever
character, as contributing causes, we do not deem it
necessary at this point to discuss, because they were
eliminated, as we have heretofore shown, by Plaintiffs'
principal expert. In other words, we claim, as the
Commission found, that the facts in this case boil down
to this, that Jones, at the time in question, was performing his duties in the ordinary way in which he was expected to perform them, not exposed to any conditions
that would not be expected to be encountered at the
beginning of such a run or campaign as had commenced.
It cannot be assumed that there would not be difficulties
encountered under the circumstances, alse there would
be no deed for a foreman. Suddenly he suffers a coronary occlusion, either while at work or thereafter,
which because of the condition already existing in his
body might result at any time and any place, in a coronary occlusion. From these facts alone it is to be presumed that such occlusion is compensable~ We submit
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that to so assume would make coronary occlusions happening while at work or thereafter the equivalent of an
occupational disease, although no legislative enactment
has made it such, and would be going beyond what this
court has ever held, and constitute legislation upon its
part.
In this connection, we invite the Court's attention
to the following statement in Counsel's Brief:
''The Commission may consider itself as merely
determining the ultimate fact when it denied
that Jones suffered an accident, arising out of
the course of his employment, that the conditions under which he worked did not contribute
to his ailment, and that if he did suffer an accident, it had nothin_g to do with his work and was
not compensable. But when a finder of facts
sets forth the reasoning by which he approaches
that ultimate fact, and thereby discloses such
an unreasonable disregard of the evidence as
this decision discloses, the validity of all results
:reached must be tested by the steps taken to
reach them and cannot be conjectured to have
been placed on any higher ground than the steps
disclose to have been attained. So judged, as
we think it must he judged, the entire decision
of· the Commission rests upon an entirely in,adequate foundation.''
As we interpret this language, what counsel mean
to say is that if the Commission had contented itself
with finding merely the ultimate facts, then such finding could not be assailed, hut because, as they claim,
there was no sufficient foundation for the findings of
particular facts, whether one or more or all is not clear,
found by the Commission, it must be held to have acted
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arbitrarily or capriciously. We do not understand such
to be a correct statement, because in a review such as
this, it is the ulimate fact, and not the subsidiary facts,
which must be shown to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. Howeverr, assuming without
conceding, that counsel is correct, we proceed at the
risk of some repetition to consider the particular facts
as to which it is claimed the Commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously in the finding that they did not
contribute to the coronary occlusion.
POINT 2
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING BY THE CO:MMISSION AS TO THE
PARTICULAR FACTS FOUND BY THEM.
Counsel states these findings and their objection
to them under five letter headings in two places, and we
shall consider them seriatim.
(A) as Eta ted on page 18, is as follows;
''That the Commissioner who viewed the premises did not believe the movement of the air
through the building was sufficiently obstructed
as to create an unhealthyy condition in the area
where the motors were situate.''
It is more elaborately stated on Page 20. In the
latter, it is stated that the view by the Commissioner
is the only evidence in the record contrary to the evidence that Jones as he worked on the booster engine
was so hemmed in as to produce an unhealthy condition there. We have at length set out the evidence which
shows that there was no such "hemming in", as claimed
by counsel, and have shown that there is no justifica-
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tion for the claim that the Co,mmission did not take
into consideration the evidence as well as the view in
determining that it was not proven that there was any
sufficient hwk of purity in the air to cause or contribute to the coronary occlusion suffered by Jones. We
have further pointed out tha.t that finding is concurred
in by at least one of Plaintiffs' medical experts, Dr.

Zexn.an.
On Page 20, this statement is also made:
"There is proof, without contradiction, that beat
built up in the vicinity of the large motor operating at 200 degrees temperature''.
We have fully discussed in our statement of facts the
lack of evidence to show how hot it really was, and it
need not to be repeated here.
A statement is also made concerning the fumes from
the small motor. Then, counsel say
''There is proof ---,- if any were needed of the
fact of nature of which the Court will take judicial notice - that such fumes, intermingled in
the air, contained carbon dioxide, that with or
without carbon dioxide, presence of the fumes
lowered the oxygen content of the air which Jones
breathed.''
What a lot of judicial knowledge this Court is expected
to have? And how it is to be substituted for proof?
More knowledge than even Plaintiffs' expert doctor
had, so as to be able to find contrary to what he determined, as well as what the Commission who heard the
evidence found.
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(B) as stated on page 18, is as follows:
"That there ,,~as no evidence that carbon dioxide gas was a factor."
As we conceive it, this is simply a reiteration as a
part of A, and what we have said under that head is
all that need be said here, except that on page 21 the
following occurs:
''There is undisputed evidence that the air about
the motor was filled with fumes, that oil ran
down the sides of the defective pipe, that the
motor, when turned over without igniting, would
pump out this oil, and that the partially burned
or heated oil would give off carbon dioxide.''
True, it is, that some of the Plaintiffs' witnesses
so testified, except they did not attempt to designate
the gas as carbon dioxide. That designation is the
contribution of counsel. The statement poses this question: If the gasoline did not ignite, what would cause
the oil to burn, and give off gas, whether carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, or any other gas?
(C) as stated on Page 18, is as follows:
"That there was no evidence in the case sufficient to justify the finding of a sereve emotional
upset.''
We have so fully covered this subject in our statement of facts and in our argument under Point 1, that
we deem any further discussion of the matter at this
point unnecessary.
(D) Counsel, in setting out the findings objected to
under this head on Page 18, extracts parts of paragraphs
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of the Decision, for which reason we quote the entire
paragraphs instead of mere extracts therefrom as
follows:
' ' The evidence regarding exertion, fatigue, worry
is very unsatisfactory. In fact, if we believe
all that evidence, we must conclude that deceased
was not subjected· to any of these factors in a
degree materially in excess of the exertion, ete.,
to which all individuals in every walk of life or at
hom~ are subjected.
''The physicians who testified all stated that
they were not concerned with exertion, gas, or
fatigue except in combination. All of them stated
that all of the circumstances combined might
contribute to the occlusion. We do not believe
that the combination of circumstances which applicant attempts to prove constitute an accident
and that the employer should be ·charged with
the results of a combination of forces operating
within and without the employment over a period
of days, particularly when everybody is almost
daily subjected to the same force in .substantially the same degree. Applicant cited authority in support of the exertion theory but it should
be noted that the experts used the words 'severe
exertion' . The same is true of fatigue. There
is no evidence of exertion or fatigue.''
As we see it, no complaint can be made with respect
to these findings, because they do not on their face disclose any arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of
the Commission, and as we have repeatly pointed out,
they are justified by the evidence. It would only be
the hypercritical that could object to the last sentence,
but it is perfectly obvious what the Commission meant
and by implication intended to say, namely, that there
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is no evidence of such exertion or fatigue, because in
the sentence next but one preceding, the Commission
was talking about severe exertion. In the next sentence,
it is speaking of severe fatigue. So in the last sentence,
it is speaking of such, that is, severe exertion, severe
fatigue. Surely, this Court could not find that the
Commission was arbitrary or capricious because of this
linguistic technicality.
Likewise, we do not believe the statement on page
22 of (D) is justified. Counsel there say:
''(D) The finding that the deceased was subjected to normal worry, fatigue, exertion, such
as individuals generally are subjected to in their
daily lives, at work or at home, almost daily, in
substantially the same degree indicates a complete failure to evalute the evidence."
In fact, as we view the evidence, the Commission
in so finding, and here again it requires an impartial
consideration of all the evidence to determine the matter, cannot he said to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Indeed, even if this Court were required to
pass upon the weight of the evidence, we submit it would
find as the Commission did.
(E) as stated on page 18, is as follows:
''That there was not evidence sufficient to support a finding that the oxygen content of the air
had been reduced sufficiently to cause a 'sludging of the blood, which in turn caused the blocking of the coronary artery.'''
In the argument, under this heading on page 25,
counsel claim that the autopsy so shows. This is not
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correct nor does the report of the autopsy so show. Cel"
tainly not the quoted portion in the Brief. What the
summary of the report of the autopsy does say is
"The relationship of the immediate cause of
occlusion is probably on the basis of an anoxia.''
Let it be assumed that anoxia means the same as anoxemia, or a deficiency of oxygen. It is stated as a probability, and it is not stated where in the body it probably
was, but Dr. ·Zeman, who performed the autopsy proably intended to say in the heart or circulatory system. The record shows, then, that an anoxia was only
a probability as far as Dr. Zeman was concerned, and
it further shows that Dr. Zeman merely gave as his
opinion another probability that sludging caused the
anoxia. Contrary to counsel's statement, he did not
and could not say either in his report of the autopsy
or in his testimony that sludging did actually occur.
It does not mean as we shall show, even if the
sludging theory be accepted, that there was any probability of a deficiency in oxygen in the air Jones was
breathing in the shed while at work on the small motor.
On the contrary, as we have repeatedly stated, counsel
are as wrong in interpreting the testimony of Dr. Zeman
as they are with respect to his report. Although he
said that a deficiency of oxygen in the air could be a
cause of a coronary, it would depend entirely on the extent of the defieiency. He even ~ave what that extent
would have to be, more than twenty percent, and inasmuch as it could not be determined whether there was
any deficiency in the air Jones was breathing, or the
extent of it, he entirely eliminated any deficiency in the
air as a possible cause of the coronary occlusion which
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Jones su,ffe:red, whether resulting from fumes, or other.
wise, because it was impossible to determine its extent.
Though he repeatedly so stated, this is best illustrated
in a colloquy which took place between Commissioner
Wiesley and Dr. Zeman at the conclusion of the Doctor's
testimony as follows:
''Com. Wiesley: We have to assume that there
was sufficient carbon dioxide in this atmosphere to reduce the oxygen content to contribute
to coronary occlusion, and yet nobody knows how
much was in the air. We know it was a gasoline
motor and the testimony has been there was smoke
coming out at points from the cracks in the pipe
and so on. It was not, on the other hand, a closed
space.
''A. I think the only way we could be positive
about it would be to repeat the experiment and
that is difficult, under the same temperature and
so forth. You would have conclusive evidence.''
In other words, his testimony throughout was that
the factors which might cause a coronary occlusion
would depend upon their extent or degree whether it
would be fatigue, as a result of insufficient rest, effort
unusal to the work a person habitually does, or emotional upset, resulting from a person being unable to
do his work, or insufficiency of oxygen in the air. He
eliminated the last in this case, because the assumed
facts upon which the hypothetical question was based
did not, as it could not, inform him as to the extent of
the claimed deficiency in the air. He based his opinion
solely upon the other assumed factors, which as stated
in the question, whether they really existed or not, were
sufficient to enable him to have an opinion as to their
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extent. The reason, as we claim, that the Commission
was justified in rejecting his conclusions is that it found
as it had a right to do under the evidence that the facts
assumed in the question did not exist.
So far as the particular question is concerned, the
result of the summary of the report of the autopsy and
the doctor's testimony is that he must either be charged
with inconsistency or he must account for his claim of
a deficiency in some other way. This he does in this
way: - knowing as he does that a person may have a
coronary occlusion even when he is breathing the purest
of air, he says that a deficiency in oxygen may he shown
not because there is any deficiency of oxygen in the
air, but because the person breathing that air is unable
to take care of it in the normal way because of the other
factors which may bring about that situation and may
cause a sludging of the blood.
This Court in the Woodburn case had before it just
such a case. Woodburn was breathing the purest mountain air up in Snow Basin, and yet he suffered a heart
attack. Dr. Zeman was a witness in that case. That was
not a death case so that no autopsy was had. If Woodburn had died, and the doctor arrived at the conclusion
above stated, namely that there was a probability of a
deficiency of oxygen, he would have to attempt to account for such deficiency as above stated.
It must be horne in mind that we are considering
what is at best a theory, which was rejected by Dr. Peterson, and by the Commission. We are therefore not
concerned with its validity. All we are concerned with
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is that the statement of the doctor who performed the
autopsy that there was a probable deficiency of oxygen
is no proof that, as contended by counsel, there was any
deficiency of oxygen in the air Jones was breathing,
and that we haYe now conclusively demonstrated.
CONCLUSIONS
Having now answered all of the contentions made
by counsel for Plaintiffs' in their Brief; having shown
that the Commission in making their findings did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously, we respectfully submit its
denial of an award in this case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General of the State of Utah
Attorney for The Industrial Commission
of Utah
Utah State Capitol Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for California Packing
Corporation
625 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
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